How to Create a New European Plan for Investment by Messori, M.
	   	  
 
Policy Brief – 09/2015 
	   	  
	  
HOW	  TO	  CREATE	  A	  NEW	  EUROPEAN	  PLAN	  FOR	  INVESTMENT	  
 Marcello	  Messori	  	  
	   	   	  
1 
	  
An	   abridged	   version	   of	   this	   brief	   was	   first	   published	   in	   German	   and	   Italian	   by	   Süddeutsche	  
Zeitung.	   The	   current,	   edited	   version	   is	   presented	   here	   with	   permission	   from	   the	   original	  
publisher.	  
	  
1.	  Introduction	  The	   Greek	   crisis	   which	   began	   six	   years	   ago,	   is	   an	   extreme	   case	   that	   has	   brought	   to	   light	  deficiencies	  of	  the	  euro	  area.	  It	  was	  characterized	  by	  a	  series	  of	  untimely	  and	  vainly	  punitive	  decisions	   on	   the	  part	   of	   the	   other	  member	   states	   of	   the	  European	  Economic	   and	  Monetary	  Union	   (EMU),	   unbearable	   and	   unattainable	   requests	   to	   make	   macroeconomic	   adjustments	  and	   reforms	   on	   the	   part	   of	   European	   institutions,	   and	   encouraging	   but	   eventually	   fruitless	  commitments	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Greek	  government.	  	  These	   circumstances	   ended	   up	   maximizing	   the	   economic	   and	   social	   costs	   linked	   to	   the	  preexisting	   structural	   fragility	   of	   Greece,	   causing	   the	   financial	   size	   of	   the	   aid	   programs	  promoted	  by	  EMU	  members	  and	  European	  institutions	  to	  balloon,	  and	  resulting	  in	  partial	  and	  distorted	   adjustments	   of	   the	   Greek	   economy.	   Those	   adjustments	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	  expectations	   of	   growth	   and	   well-­‐being	   characterizing	   Greece	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   new	  century	  were	  misleading,	  but	  they	  also	  contributed	  to	  lead	  the	  Greek	  economy	  to	  depression	  and	  Greek	  society	  to	  a	  state	  of	  emergency.	  	  
2.	  The	  Legacy	  of	  the	  2010	  Greek	  Crisis	  The	   situation	   described	   above	  was	   already	   fed	   by	   the	   first	   European	   aid	   intervention	   that	  came	  into	  existence	   in	  April	  2010	  in	  the	   form	  of	   five-­‐year	  bilateral	   loans	  to	  Greece	  (totaling	  €110	  billion),	  which	  were	  funded	  by	  all	  the	  other	  EMU	  members	  states	  and	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF).	  The	   interest	   rates	  on	   these	   loans	  were	   too	  high	  and	   the	  aid	  program	  required	   macroeconomic	   adjustments	   that	   were	   too	   ambitious	   for	   the	   very	   fragile	   Greek	  economic	   institutions,	   including	   overly	   severe	   measures	   to	   reduce	   government	   deficit	   and	  debt,	   €50	   billion	   in	   planned	   privatizations,	   and	   radical	   structural	   reforms	   to	   improve	  competitiveness.	  As	  a	  result,	  despite	  the	  parallel	  purchase	  of	  Greek	  government	  bonds	  by	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	   (ECB)	  on	   secondary	   financial	  markets	   through	   the	   “Security	  Market	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Program”	   (SMP),	   there	   was	   a	   covert	   restructuring	   of	   bilateral	   loans	   in	   March	   2011,	  accomplished	  by	  way	  of	  a	  maturity	  extension	  and	  decrease	  in	  interest	  rates	  due.	  Moreover,	  in	  October	   2011,	   the	   Eurogroup	   was	   forced	   to	   admit	   the	   impossibility	   of	   financing	   Greek	  government	  debt	  through	  the	   issuing	  of	  bonds	  and	  their	  sale	  on	  the	  market	  until	   the	  end	  of	  2014.	  Consequently,	  these	  debt	  maturities	  had	  to	  be	  matched	  by	  means	  of	  a	  second	  European	  loan	  totaling	  €130	  billion.	  	  This	  new	  European	  aid	  program	  was	   implemented	   in	  March	  2012,	  with	   the	   involvement	  of	  private	  holders	  of	  Greek	  government	  bonds	  who	  had	  to	  accept	  a	  cut	  equal	  to	  more	  than	  half	  the	  nominal	  value	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  holdings.	  On	  the	  flipside,	  Greek	  policy	  makers	  had	  to	  commit	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  previous,	  unrealized	  policy	  initiatives	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	   a	   number	   of	   additional	   restrictive	   economic	  measures.	   The	   aim	  was	   to	   reduce	   Greece’s	  ratio	   of	   public	   debt	   to	   GDP	   to	   120.5%	   by	   2020.	   In	   actuality,	   these	   measures	   dramatically	  increased	  the	  insolvency	  risk	  of	  government	  bonds	  issued	  by	  other	  peripheral	  member	  states	  of	  the	  EMU	  as	  assessed	  by	  the	  market;	  moreover,	   they	  corroded	  the	  trust	  European	  citizens	  had	   in	   European	   institutions.	   Meanwhile,	   structural	   problems	   within	   the	   Greek	   economy	  remained	  unaffected.	  As	  early	  as	  June	  2012,	  the	  Eurogroup	  had	  to	  admit	  the	  failure	  of	  its	  new	  program.	   In	   December	   2012,	   it	   became	   necessary	   to	   start	   a	   new	   phase	   of	   Greek	   loan-­‐restructuring,	  with	  a	  simultaneous	  re-­‐purchase	  of	  residual	  public	  debt	  	  from	  private	  investors	  by	  the	  Greek	  government.	  	  
3.	  The	  New	  Iteration	  of	  the	  Greek	  Crisis	  The	  framework	  above,	  among	  other	  factors,	  explains	  the	  mid-­‐2015	  expiration	  of	  the	  European	  aid	  program	  to	  Greece	  and	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  negotiations	  between	  European	  institutions	  and	  the	  new	  Greek	  government	  led	  by	  PM	  Alexis	  Tsipras,	  which	  took	  place	  in	  the	  early	  months	  of	  2015.	  The	  various	  phases	  of	  these	  dramatic	  negotiations	  cannot	  be	  analyzed	  in	  detail	  here.	  Let	  me	  just	  emphasize	  that	  they	  led	  to	  four	  findings	  which	  are	  crucial	  for	  understanding	  why	  the	  most	   recent	  developments	   in	   the	  Greek	  crisis	  produced	  a	   legacy	   that	   looms	  menacingly	  over	  the	  future	  of	  the	  EMU.	  	  Above	   all,	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   history	   of	   the	   euro,	   the	  mésalliance	   between	   a	   group	   of	  “central”	  countries	  (specifically,	  Germany)	  and	  the	  Greek	  delegation	  risked	  to	  determine	  the	  “exit”	  of	  a	  member	  state.	  This	  exit	  would	  have	  brought	  with	  it	  the	  potential	  to	  transform	  the	  monetary	   union	   into	   a	   fixed	   exchange	   rate	   system,	   thus	   exposing	   the	   euro	   currency	   to	  financial	  speculation	  (as	  witnessed	  during	  the	  recurring	  monetary	  crises	  between	  1973	  and	  1992).	   The	   eventual	   end	   of	   the	   euro	   would	   have	   reduced	   the	   European	   Union	   to	   a	   trade	  agreement,	  turning	  back	  the	  clock	  by	  at	  least	  half	  a	  century.	  	  Secondly,	   the	   decision	  made	   by	   Tsipras	   at	   the	   end	   of	   June	   2015	   to	   call	   a	   referendum	   on	   a	  previous	   potential	   agreement	   that	   was	   no	   longer	   on	   the	   table,	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	  desperate	  move	  to	  liberate	  himself	  from	  the	  more	  extreme	  elements	  of	  the	  Syriza	  party.	  Here	  it	  matters	  that	  this	  move	  also	  caused	  a	  situation	  that	  had	  no	  precedent	  in	  the	  EMU,	  that	  is	  a	  situation	  without	  technical	  solutions	  and	   just	  entrusted	  to	  political	  choices.	   	  The	  decision	  to	  call	  a	  referendum	  required,	  in	  fact,	  Greece	  to	  leave	  the	  old	  European	  aid	  program	  and	  declare	  its	   insolvency	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   IMF,	   thus	   preventing	   the	   ECB	   from	  providing	   emergency	  financing	  to	  the	  Greek	  banking	  sector,	  and	  thereby	  causing	  a	  collapse	  of	  the	  banking	  system	  and	  the	  entire	  economy.	  	  Thirdly,	   the	  purely	  political	   agreement	   reached	  mid-­‐July	  at	   the	   “twenty-­‐fifth	  hour”	  between	  European	  governments	  and	  Tsipras	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  draft	  of	  a	  €86bn	  aid	  plan,	  matured	  in	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a	  rancorous	  climate.	  The	  latter	  eliminated	  much	  of	  the	  residual	  trust	  between	  member	  states	  and	  between	  the	  institutions	  of	  EMU	  and	  its	  citizens.	  The	   fourth	   point	   stands	   on	   a	   pure	   economic	   ground.	   The	   new	   drafted	   plan	   reiterated	  previous,	  unrealistic	  requests	  for	  adjustments	  and	  reforms	  imposed	  on	  the	  Greek	  government	  in	  the	  prior	  failed	  aid	  program,	  earmarking	  much	  of	  the	  €86	  billion	  toward	  payments	  for	  past	  debts	  and	  rescuing	  the	  banking	  sector;	  moreover,	  it	  was	  still	  more	  punitive	  towards	  any	  short	  term	  expansionary	  policy.	  As	  such,	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  actual	  new	  aid	  program	  approved	  by	  the	  Eurogroup	  in	  mid-­‐August	  is	  unlikely	  to	  spark	  economic	  growth	  and	  overcome	  the	  Greek	  crisis.	  As	  has	  been	  indirectly	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  political	  instability	  in	  Greece	  (with	  new	  elections	  scheduled	  for	  these	  days	  of	  September),	  the	  “Greek	  issue”	  will	  present	  itself	  once	  more	  in	  due	  course,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  need	  to	  restructure	  public	  debt.	  	  	  	  
4.	  The	  Proposed	  Paths	  It	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  equate	  the	  four	  points	  detailed	  above	  with	  some	  of	  the	  various	  stages	  of	  the	   Greek	   crisis	   between	   2010	   and	   2012.	   There	   are	   at	   least	   three	   notable	   differences:	   the	  lengthy	  recession	  in	  the	  EMU	  (2011-­‐13)	  reduced	  the	  macroeconomic	  imbalances	  in	  the	  short	  term	   inside	   the	  area	  while	  sharpening	  structural	  gaps	   in	  competitiveness	  between	  “central”	  and	  “peripheral”	  countries;	  the	  exit	  of	  a	  member	  state	  from	  the	  euro	  became	  a	  possibility,	  and	  therefore	   the	   EMU	   can	   now	   be	   perceived	   as	   a	   reversible	   union;	   the	   European	   institutions’	  scope	   for	   action	   is	   today	   limited	   by	   the	   declining	   trust	   between	   member	   states	   and	   an	  insufficient	  level	  of	  representation	  legitimacy,	  particularly	   	  when	  the	  constituency	  of	  each	  of	  these	  members	   is	   taken	   into	   account.	   The	   interaction	   between	   each	   of	   these	   new	   negative	  developments	  created	  an	  explosive	  combination,	  requiring	  changes	  that	  had	  deeply	  uncertain	  outcomes.	  	  A	  few	  actors	  of	  European	  policies	  are	  conscious	  that	  the	  situation	  at	  hand	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  great	  moment.	   However	   their	   proposals	   lead	   to	   two	   diverging	   directions	  which	   strengthen	   cross	  vetoes,	   and	   thus	   hinder	   the	   search	   for	   stable	   solutions.	   Some	   genuine	   Europeanists	   in	   the	  “central”	  countries	  (above	  all,	  German	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  Schäuble)	  sustain	  that	  overcoming	  the	  difficulties	   facing	   the	  EMU	  requires	  more	  drastic	   reductions	   in	   the	  deficits	   and	  debts	  of	  public	  finances.	  This	  touches	  upon	  creating	  a	  fiscal	  authority	  for	  the	  EMU	  with	  the	  power	  to	  compel	  member	   states	   to	  meet	   the	   agreed	   fiscal	   rules.	  Only	   this	  way,	   in	   the	   opinion	   of	  Mr.	  Schäuble	  and	  his	  allies,	  would	   it	  be	  possible	   to	  overcome	  excessive	  gaps	   in	  competitiveness	  and	  lack	  of	  trust,	  the	  only	  path	  through	  which	  fiscal	  unification	  and	  political	  federalism	  can	  be	  achieved.	   On	   the	   flipside,	   many	   Europeanists	   in	   the	   “peripheral”	   countries	   retain	   that	   the	  solution	  to	  the	  current	  impasse	  in	  the	  EMU	  requires	  political	  and	  institutional	  discontinuities,	  a	  move	  to	  reinforce	  the	  European	  method	  (versus	  the	  intergovernmental	  one)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	   and	   representation	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   in	   order	   to	   limit	   the	   power	   of	   the	  European	  bureaucracy.	  This	  could	  open	  the	  path	  toward	  a	  federal	  union,	  similar	  to	  the	  United	  States,	   in	  which	   the	   disjointed	   competitive	   and	   fiscal	   environment	   between	  member	   states	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  an	  unmanageable	  element	  of	  instability.	  	  Both	  these	  proposals	  do	  not	  appear	  capable	  of	  resolving	  the	  EMU’s	  actual	  problems.	  The	  first	  assumes	   that	   the	   lack	   of	   trust	  will	   be	   resolvable	   through	   rigorous	   controls	   over	   the	   risk	   of	  opportunistic	   behaviors	   on	   the	   side	   of	   “peripheral”	   countries,	  without	   asking	   if	   the	   choices	  made	  by	  “central”	  countries	  are	  shared	  by	  others.	  Additionally,	  it	  also	  assumes	  a	  causality	  link	  between	   fiscal	   tightening	  and	  economic	  growth,	  something	  which	  the	  extended	  recession	   in	  Europe	   has	   put	   into	   serious	   doubt.	   The	   second	   proposal	   assumes	   transfers	   of	   national	  sovereignty	   and	   institutional	   cohesion	   can	   be	   achieved	   without	   reciprocal	   trust	   between	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member	  states.	  Moreover,	   it	   forgets	  that	  the	  historical	  and	  institutional	  peculiarities	  of	  each	  country	  belonging	   to	   the	  EMU	   (path	  dependence)	  would	  make	   creating	   a	  union	  akin	   to	   the	  United	   States	   impossible,	   so	   that	   	   the	   competitive	   and	   fiscal	   gaps	   between	  members	   states	  cannot	  be	  managed	  in	  the	  same	  way	  in	  these	  two	  areas.	  	  	  
5.	  The	  Way	  Ahead	  The	  changes	   in	  economic	  and	   institutional	  setting	  of	   the	  EMU	  must	  be	  as	  profound	  as	  those	  evoked	  by	  the	  two	  just	  mentioned	  and	  opposite	  proposals,	  but	  their	  implementation	  must	  be	  more	  gradual.	  First,	  short	  and	  medium-­‐long	  term	  measures	  must	  be	  put	  in	  place	  to	  re-­‐launch	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  euro	  area.	   In	  this	  regard,	  the	  principal	  role	  would	  be	  entrusted	  to	  a	  European	  plan	  for	  investment	  that	  takes	  cues	  from	  the	  Juncker	  plan,	  but	  one	  that	  is	  financially	  more	  robust	  and	  that	  can	  favor	  “peripheral”	  countries.	  This	  new	  plan	  would	  be	  an	  ideal	  bridge	  between	   a	   short	   term	   support	   of	   aggregate	   demand	   in	   the	   EMU	   and	   a	   medium-­‐long	   term	  recovery	  of	  competitiveness	  in	  “peripheral”	  countries.	  Moreover,	  the	  attainment	  of	  the	  2008	  economic	  values	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  	  percentage	  of	  investment	  on	  	  GDP	  and	  the	  renewal	  of	  a	  stable	   path	   for	   growth	   are	   both	   requisite	   conditions,	   even	   if	   they	   may	   not	   be	   sufficient,	  because	  each	  member	  state	  of	   the	  EMU	  can	  have	  room	  to	   implement	   the	   fiscal	  adjustments	  and	  reforms	  deemed	  necessary	  for	  reducing	  macroeconomic	  imbalances	  to	  a	  given	  threshold	  compatible	  with	  	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  euro	  area.	  It	  is,	  in	  fact,	  easier	  to	  implement	  reforms,	  which	  always	   bring	   social	   costs,	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   increase	   in	   employment	   and	   income	   than	  during	  a	  recession.	  	  For	  these	  national	  reforms	  to	  coincide	  with	  those	  necessary	  for	  strengthening	  the	  EMU,	  each	  member	   state	  would	  have	   to	  agree	  upon	   their	   content	  and	   the	  consequent	  policy	  measures	  with	  European	  institutions	  by	  means	  of	  “contractual”	  agreements	  (relating	  to	  the	  “contractual	  arrangements”).	   The	   latter	   can	   also	   facilitate	   the	   compliance	   of	   these	   same	  measures	  with	  specific	   public	   balance	   constraints;	   and	   this	   could	   help	   begin	   efficient	   coordination	   in	   the	  fiscal	   field	   inside	   the	   EMU.	   This	   coordination	   could	   be	   built,	   in	   its	   turn,	   upon	   a	   form	   of	  European	   insurance	   (e.g.	   by	   making	   recourse	   to	   the	   European	   Stability	   Mechanism).	   The	  resulting	   virtuous	   circle	   between	   adjustments	   and	   national	   reforms,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	  European	   insurance	   schemes,	   on	   the	  other,	  would	  naturally	  blend	   into	   the	   creation	  of	   risk-­‐sharing	   relationships	   between	  member	   states.	   This	   could	   help	   to	   build	   up	   a	   solid	   base	   for	  creating	   a	   “European	  minister	   of	   finance”	   and	   for	  moving	   financial	   resources	   from	  national	  public	  balance	  sheets	  to	  an	  EMU-­‐wide	  one.	  The	  creation	  of	  an	  EMU	  balance	  sheet,	  however,	   requires	  a	  European	   fiscal	  capacity.	  Due	   to	  the	   irrevocable	   principle	   of	   “no	   taxation	  without	   representation,”	   this	   fiscal	   capacity	   could	  become	  an	  economic	  lever	  for	  giving	  representation	  legitimacy	  to	  European	  institutions,	  and	  thus	  for	  renewing	  a	  trust	  relationship	  between	  these	  institutions	  and	  citizens	  of	  the	  EMU.	  The	  unification	   of	   fiscal	   policy	   and	   that	   of	   federal	   policy	  would	   become	   two	   components	   of	   the	  same	  process.	  
